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Introduction
This Article explores the relationship between shareholder ethical responsibility and corporate 
law. Shareholder responsibility is a neglected aspect of the debate about corporate social 
responsibility. In that debate, conservatives defend the view that corporate law obligates 
management to pursue stockholders’ profit without regard to ethical considerations or social 
responsibility except insofar as the latter might affect profits. Even some critics of profit 
maximization concede the accuracy of the conservatives’ description of management’s corporate 
law duties, and blame those duties for corporations’ antisocial behavior. The truth is, however, that 
corporate law does not preclude the independent consideration of ethics or social responsibility. In 
this Article, I argue that if the critics are correct that corporate power is used unethically and 
irresponsibly in the pursuit of greater profits, it is not so much because of corporate law as because 
of the self-interest and inertia of shareholders, for whom the maximization of their profits is 
congenial.
The “responsible” shareholder is, therefore, important because with such shareholders rather 
than with corporate managers alone rests any hope one might have for greater corporate social 
responsibility. 
2Curiously, however, many academic corporate lawyers are dismissive or suspicious of the 
notion of ethical investment decision-making, by which I mean the making of investment decisions 
at least partly on the basis of considerations other than profit or other self-interest. Ethical 
investment decision-making is, I argue, unimpeachable from the standpoint of the conception of the 
corporation that now predominates in the corporate law academy — the view that the corporation is 
best thought of as a “nexus of contracts” among the various participants. However, ethical 
investors are awkward for those academic corporate lawyers who subscribe to the view that 
corporations should be managed exclusively with a view to the maximization of stockholder 
profits, a normative position not entailed by the “nexus of contracts” conception. In this Article, I 
suggest that it is misguided to respond to this tension, as some prominent theorists of the 
corporation have done, by disparaging ethical investment decision-making. 
The Article is organized as follows. In Part I, I outline the debate concerning the legality and 
desirability of corporate social responsibility and discuss the underlying theoretical framework. In 
Part II, I articulate the view that shareholders have a degree of responsibility for the conduct of 
incorporated business, because they are the people for whose benefit the conduct occurs and no one
forces them to invest. In Part III, I discuss the relationship between shareholder responsibility and 
the conventional theoretical framework for the normative analysis of corporate law.
In Part IV, I discuss the implications of the foregoing for three specific questions arising in the 
context of ethical investing, namely (a) whether corporate management should be permitted (or 
required) to take into account the expressed ethical views of groups of shareholders; (b) whether 
disclosure of matters relevant to ethical analysis of corporate conduct should be mandatory; and (c) 
whether corporate law should filter out ethically-motivated shareholder proposals.
Two qualifications about the scope of this Article are in order before proceeding further. First, 
the focus of this article is on shareholders in widely-held corporations, and so I will not discuss 
“socially responsible” investments in anything other than publicly traded shares. Second, I assume 
an individual shareholder investing for his or her own account, and do not discuss pension funds, 
socially responsible mutual funds, or other intermediaries, as I want to focus on corporate law 
issues and leave to one side, for present purposes, issues arising under the law of trusts.
Part I — Corporate law and profit maximization
The persistently ambiguous state of the law
In the corporate law academy today in the United States, the dominant view is that corporate 
law requires managers to pursue a single aim: the maximization of stockholder profits.1
One sign of the dominance of the view is a certain triumphalism on the part of those who 
believe that stockholder profit maximization is normatively desirable. For example, in a 
provocative article, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have announced “the end of history 
1
 Blair and Stout are prominent dissenters from this view. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 303-05 (1999). Although sometimes the goal is 
stated as the maximization of the “corporation’s” profits, it is important to bear in mind that, by accounting 
convention, the profits of the corporation are calculated in such a manner as to correspond exactly to the 
increase in the shareholders’ equity in the corporation.
3for corporate law”:2 they argue that it is settled that the main purpose of corporate law is to 
maximize “long-term shareholder value”,3 and they claim that legal systems in other nations are 
converging towards this position, or will slowly but surely be drawn to it, in large part because of 
its inherent superiority.4
Moreover, even some of those who support broader conceptions of corporate aims concede 
defeat on the descriptive question whether corporate law requires an exclusive focus on profit 
maximization. A recent example is Joel Bakan’s book, The Corporation, and the related 
documentary film, in which corporations are “diagnosed” as psychopathic.5 Bakan argues that 
corporations are that way because of corporate law, which he says obligates corporate managers to 
exploit workers, communities and consumers if it will increase profits.6
In my view, both those who praise an exclusive focus on shareholder profit maximization and 
those who deplore it exaggerate its claim to describe accurately the state of corporate law in the 
United States. The legal situation is, in fact, persistently ambiguous.
In describing the duties of directors, U.S. corporations statutes typically refer to “the interests 
of the corporation.”7 It is far from clear that the plain meaning of these words requires that the 
interests of the corporation be understood as synonymous with the maximization of the 
shareholders’ profits from the venture.8 Indeed nearly half of the states have adopted so-called 
2
 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 
(2001).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 468. Other examples include Roberta Romano and Jonathan Macey. Romano has written without 
providing arguments in support, that “the objective of U.S. corporate law is to maximize share value”: see, 
e.g., Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of 
Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J.  ON REG. 174, 186 n.30 (2001) [hereinafter Romano, Less is More]; id. 
at 246; See also Arnoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, Monitoring Corporate Performance: The Role of 
Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 356, 363 n.21 
(2004)  (arguing that U.S. corporate law obligates management to pursue the maximization of the value of 
the shareholders’ investment, and no other interest); and Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, 
Corporate Disclosure and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 403 n.49 (2004) (same). 
5
 JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 
56-57 (Viking Canada 2004); The Corporation (Big Picture Media Corporation 2004).
6
 BAKAN, supra note 5, at 1-2 (“The corporation’s legally defined mandate is to pursue, relentlessly and 
without exception, its own interest, regardless of the often harmful consequences it might cause to others”); 
Id. at 39 (“The rule that corporations exist solely to maximize returns to their shareholders is ‘the law of the 
land’”). Robert Hinkley argues, similarly, that because “the people who run corporations have a legal duty to 
shareholders, and that duty is to make money,… [c]orporate law thus casts ethical and social concerns as 
irrelevant, or as stumbling blocks to the corporation’s fundamental mandate.” See Robert Hinkley, How 
Corporate Law Inhibits Social Responsibility, (Jan.-Feb.) BUS. ETHICS: CORP. SOCIAL RESP. REPORT 
(2002), at http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0119-04.htm.
7 See, e.g.,CAL. CORP. CODE tit. 1, § 309(a) (2004) (“in the best interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders”); NY CLS BUS. CORP. art. 7, § 717(b) (2004) (“the long-term and the short-term interests of 
the corporation and its shareholders”); NRS tit. 7, § 138(1) (2004) (“interests of the corporation”); Illinois 
Business Corporation Act of 1983 § 8.85, 805 ILCS 5 (2004) (“best long term and short term interests of the 
corporation”); N.J. STAT. tit. 14A, § 14A:6-1 (2004) (“best inerest of the corporation”).     
8
 French corporate lawyers know this, working as they do with the analogous concept of intérêt social, which 
goes beyond the interests of the shareholders. See ASSOCIATION FRANÇAISE DES ENTREPRISES 
PRIVÉES & CONSEIL NATIONAL DU PATRONAT FRANÇAIS, LE CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION 
DES SOCIÉTÉS COTEES (RAPPORT VIENOT I) 8 (1995); Lauren J. Aste, Reforming French Corporate 
Governance: A Return to the Two-Tier Board?, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 27 (1999); see 
also Dominique Schmidt, De l’intérêt social, 38 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE ENTREPRISE ET AFFAIRES 
4“constituency” statutes, which permit or require the board of directors to consider the interests of 
non-shareholder constituencies in forming a judgment as to the best interests of the corporation.9
Directors’ duties were originally articulated by the courts as a matter of common law.10 The 
starting-point for any discussion of the case law is the 1919 decision of the Michigan Supreme 
Court in Dodge v. Ford, in which the Court wrote:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. 
The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be 
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end 
itself.11
Although the case is often interpreted as announcing an uncompromising position on profit 
maximization, subsequent case law has been more nuanced. Thus, for example, the Delaware 
courts have held that corporate charitable contributions are permissible provided that they are 
reasonable in amount and purpose.12 The reasoning of the leading judicial decision on this point 
provides support both for the position that the law recognizes the intrinsic appropriateness of 
corporate support for public causes,13 and for the seemingly contrary position that corporate 
donations are legitimate only because they are ultimately beneficial to the shareholders.14
It is commonly observed that, as a practical matter, courts will not interfere with corporate 
social responsibility because there is almost always a plausible argument that actions considerate of 
a corporation’s employees, customers or creditors or the environment are in the long-term interests 
of the corporation’s stockholders. It has been easier, because of this fact, for courts to preserve the 
ambiguity of the legal standard. 
488 (1999). Similarly, in interpreting the provision of the Canada Business Corporations Act that requires 
directors and officers to act with a view to the “best interests of the corporation,” the Supreme Court of 
Canada recently held that that phrase “should be read not simply as the ‘best interests of the shareholders.’” 
Peoples Department Stores (Trustee of) v. Wise, 2004 SCC 68, ¶ 42 (October 29, 2004).
9
  CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 33, § 33-756(d) (2003); FLA. STAT. tit. 36, §607.0830(3) (2003); HRS tit. 23, § 
414-221(b) (2003); Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983 § 8.85, 805 ILCS 5 (2004); BURNS IND. 
CODE ANN. tit. 23, §23-1-35-1(d) (2004); KRS tit. 23, § 271B.12-210(4) (2004); LA. R.S. tit. 12, § 
92(G)(2) (2004); ALM GL tit. 22, § 65 (2004); MINN. STAT. ch. 302A, § 302A.251(5) (2003); MISS. 
CODE ANN. tit. 79, § 79-4-8.30(f) (2004); NRS tit. 7, § 78.138(4) (2004); N.J. STAT. tit. 14A, § 14A:6-1(2) 
(2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 53, art. 11, § 53-11-35(D) (2004); NY CLS BUS. CORP. art. 7, § 717(b) 
(2004); N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 10, ch. 10-19.1, § 10-19.1-50(6) (2003); ORC ANN. tit. 17, ch. 1701, § 
1701.59(E) (2004); ORS tit. 7, ch. 60, § 60.357(5) (2003); PA.C.S. tit. 15, § 515 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
tit. 7, § 7-5.2-8(a) (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS tit. 47, § 47-33-4(1) (2003); V.S.A. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a) 
(2003); WIS. STAT. ch. 180, § 180.0827 (2003); WYO. STAT. tit. 17, § 17-16-830(e) (2003).             
10
 See Smith, “The Shareholder Primacy Norm”, 23 J. Corp. L. 277, 288. In the all-important state of 
Delaware, there remains no statutory statement of the entity or individuals to whom directors owe their duty 
of loyalty. In Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510, the common-law duty is articulated as one of “undivided and 
unselfish loyalty to the corporation” (emphasis added).
11
 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
12 Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del.Ch. 1969) (construing Delaware law as 
“authoriz[ing] any reasonable corporate gift of a charitable or educational nature”).
13 Id. at 404 (“the recognized obligation of corporations towards philanthropic, educational and artistic causes 
is reflected in the statutory law of all of the states, other than the states of Arizona and Idaho”).
14 Id. at 405 (“the relatively small loss of immediate income otherwise payable to [the shareholders because 
of the donation] is far out-weighed by the overall benefits flowing from [the donation, which in providing] 
justification for large private holdings, thereby [benefits the shareholders] in the long run”).
5This is not to deny that there may be situations where the interests of shareholders and non-
shareholders diverge in a manner that makes it more difficult to rationalize an act undertaken for 
the benefit of a non-shareholder constituency as being also, ultimately, in the interests of the 
shareholders. For instance, when a corporation is in financial distress, the stockholders’ interests 
might well be served by the taking of severe risks that, if they pay off, will produce profits for the 
corporation and its shareholders but, if they fail, will leave creditors unpaid. In such circumstances, 
however, Delaware law does not require corporate management to prefer the stockholders’ 
interests. To the contrary, the leading case holds that “a board of directors is not merely the agent 
of the residue [sic] risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.”15
The other paradigmatic situation of conflict between shareholders and non-shareholders’ 
interests is in connection with a hostile takeover, since the economic interest of the shareholders 
lies in having access to an above-market bid for their shares even if the takeover is expected to be 
detrimental to employees or another non-shareholder constituency. The Delaware courts have not 
unequivocally held in this context, either, that management must prefer the interests of 
shareholders. In the 1985 case of Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, the Delaware Supreme Court held 
that management may take into account the impact of the takeover on its non-shareholder 
constituencies.16 In a series of cases over the following eight years,17 the Court qualified its position 
by stating that consideration of non-stockholder interests was conditioned on the presence of 
“rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders”18 and that a focus on obtaining the best 
price for the stockholders must prevail over other considerations once the directors have decided to 
abandon their “long-term strategy” or have decided to sell the business.19 Significantly, however, 
the requirement to set aside a “long-term strategy” reconciling the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies and “benefits accruing to the stockholders” does not arise unless management has 
already decided to pursue a sale of the business or a change of control.20 That threshold decision, of 
course, may be made in the usual manner and with due regard to non-shareholder interests. 
 In light of this case law, one can easily understand why the respected former chief justice of 
Delaware’s specialist corporate law court has described the legal conception of the corporation as 
“schizophrenic,” and predicted that it would likely continue indefinitely to be so.21 It is, to say the 
least, an overstatement to claim that corporate law makes the interests of the corporation 
synonymous with the maximization of the shareholders’ profits. 
Profit maximization and the stock market
15 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathé Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
215, 108 (Dec. 30, 1991) (board of directors of a corporation in financial distress was not liable to 
shareholders for refusing to pursue a high-risk strategy preferred by the shareholders but harmful to the 
interests of the corporation’s creditors).
16 Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. Supr. 1985). 
17 Revlon v. MacAndrews, 506 A.2d 173, 193 (Del. Supr. 1986); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, 
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. Supr. 1989); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 
(Del. Supr. 1994).
18 Revlon v. MacAndrews, 506 A.2d at 193.
19
 Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43.
20 See Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289 (Del. Supr. 1994). In addition, the 
Delaware Supreme Court has held that a similar focus on shareholder value-maximization applies where a 
majority shareholder has proposed a transaction in which all of the corporation’s stock would be sold to a 
third party. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. Supr. 2000).
21
 William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 280 
(1992).
6If the law does not obligate management to focus exclusively on the maximization of the 
stockholders’ profits, there is nonetheless a mechanism which ensures that management’s conduct
is at least somewhat responsive to shareholders’ wishes: the stock market. 
If a corporation is managed in a way that is congenial to current and potential shareholders, the 
result will be a higher stock price. If management departs from what shareholders want, the stock 
price will suffer and management will be punished either through the operation of equity-based 
compensation, or, in more extreme cases, because a depressed stock price makes the corporation a 
takeover target. In this way, to a degree of approximation, it is the aggregated preferences of 
stockholders that ultimately determine management’s freedom to act responsibly, just as the 
aggregated preferences of consumers ultimately determine whether cosmetics are “cruelty-free” 
and whether the tuna fishery is “dolphin-safe.”
I want to be careful not to overstate the case for market discipline of management. Takeovers 
are, of course, expensive.22 As for equity-based compensation, Bebchuk and Fried have suggested 
that it is often structured in ways that reduce its sensitivity to the stock price and that its main 
appeal, for managers at least, may be that it is less visible than compensation in cash.23 Still, to say 
that the mechanism works approximately is not to say that it does not work at all. The basic point is 
that the stock market makes management sensitive to the aggregate preferences of current and 
potential stockholders. 
To be sure, the influence of the stock market over the conduct of corporate management is 
itself attributable to provisions of corporate law.24 Of particular importance is the shareholder 
franchise, a necessary condition for the functioning of the market for corporate control. 
Nonetheless, corporate law does not impose upon management an exclusive profit-maximizing 
duty, but merely links management’s fate to the stockholders’ pleasure. The aggregated choices of 
participants in the stock market will determine the extent of management’s freedom to pursue goals 
apart from profit-maximization. In other words, if the critics are right that management pursues 
stockholder profits to the exclusion of all considerations of ethics, decency and social 
responsibility, it is not so much because corporate law requires it as because it suits the 
stockholders.
The normative debate
I have argued that the self-interest of stockholders is a significant reason why there is not 
greater corporate social responsibility. I realize that many readers are unwilling to take for granted 
22
 For commentary skeptical of the disciplinary value of the market for corporate control, see John C. Coffee 
Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in 
Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984).
23
 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the 
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002).
24
 Lawrence E. Mitchell makes this argument in his book, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: 
AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT (2001). Mitchell describes the concept of stock price maximization as a 
“dictate that arises from the legal structure of the American corporation and the rules of corporate law,” id at 
4, by which he means not simply management’s legal duties, about which Mitchell is unspecific, but also 
management’s accountability to shareholders through the ability to elect and dismiss directors, shareholders’ 
exclusive right to bring derivative litigation, the takeover market and equity-based compensation. Id at 99-
111. Mitchell’s proposal is to reduce the accountability of management to shareholders, for example, by 
lengthening directors’ terms, id at 129-31, and to encourage or force shareholders to invest for the long term 
rather than with a view to short-term profits. Id at 157-64.
7that corporate social responsibility is necessary or desirable, and it is to this contested question that 
I now turn. I disclaim any ambition here to resolve what has become a somewhat unproductive 
debate between entrenched positions. I do want to suggest that the debate, as it pertains to 
corporate law, is ultimately over whether the limits to corporate profit maximization should be 
solely external to the corporation (such as substantive regulation or consumer market pressure) or 
whether there should be any internal limits. In my view, there is a strong argument for at least some 
internal limits. 
Conceptual and pragmatic arguments
The argument about corporate social responsibility has taken place on two planes, the 
conceptual and the pragmatic. 
On the conceptual plane, the argument for profit maximization is based on the notion that the 
shareholders, as owners of the corporation, are entitled to expect that their assets would be 
deployed to this end. Milton Friedman is a well-known defender of this view, which he first 
articulated in 1962, in arguing that the only “social responsibility” of business is “to make as much 
money for their stockholders as possible,”25 for reasons that include the fact that “[the] corporation 
is an instrument of the stockholders who own it.”26
It is important to recognize that the notion that shareholders are the “owners” of the 
corporation cuts both ways in the debate about corporate social responsibility and, in particular, can 
be invoked in support of a demand for responsibility by the shareholders themselves. For instance, 
when Dow Chemical’s management refused a request by a Dow shareholder, the Medical 
Committee for Human Rights, to include in its proxy circular a proposal to amend Dow’s charter to 
restrict the corporation’s manufacture and sale of napalm, the Medical Committee argued in 
response that “the company’s owners have not only the legal power but also the historic and 
economic obligation to determine what products their company will manufacture.”27 In granting 
review of a decision by the Securities and Exchange Commission that had upheld Dow’s decision 
to exclude the proposal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the Medical Committee’s 
characterization of the shareholders as owners.28 The Court further indicated that as owners they 
were entitled to “control … important decisions” affecting them, including those concerning the 
socially responsible conduct of corporate business.29
The arguments from ownership correspond to a theory of corporate personality known as the 
“aggregate” theory. According to the aggregate theory, the corporation is to be regarded as an 
25
 MILTON FRIEDMAN, Monopoly and the Social Responsibility of Business and Labor, in CAPITALISM 
AND FREEDOM 119, 133 (1962).
26 Id at 135; see also Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, NY 
TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
27
 Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 663 (App. D.C. 1970).
28 Id. at 680-81 (“… [concerning the statutory proxy mechanism] its overriding purpose is to assure to 
corporate shareholders the ability to exercise their right — some would say their duty — to control the 
important decisions which affect them in their capacity as stockholders and owners of the corporation” 
[emphasis added]).
29 Id. at 681 (“No reason has been advanced in the present proceedings which leads to the conclusion that 
management may properly place obstacles in the path of shareholders who wish to present to their co-owners, 
in accord with applicable state law, the question of whether they wish to have their assets used in a manner 
which they believe to be more socially responsible but possibly less profitable than that which is dictated by 
present company policy” [emphasis added]).
8extension of its shareholders,30 corporate property is the property of the shareholders in special 
form, and corporate acts are acts on behalf of the shareholders. Corporate personality is, on this 
view, merely a fiction adopted by the law for convenience.
The aggregate theory held sway with legal writers and judges from the emergence of modern 
incorporation statutes in the mid-19th century through to the end of that century. However, by the 
turn of the 20th century, the emergence of large-scale enterprises, in which shareholders played a 
passive role, made it difficult to attribute corporate acts to the shareholders themselves or to 
conceive of shareholders as owners rather than investors.31 Under the influence of German theorists 
who suggested that corporate legal personality translated the corporation’s existence as a real entity 
separate from its shareholders,32 the corporation came increasingly to be viewed as an institution in 
its own right, rather than as the shareholders in special form. This institution might have, as its 
purpose, the pursuit of profit for its stockholders,33 or it might have broader purposes. E.M. Dodd 
defended the latter position in his famous debate with A.A. Berle in the pages of the Harvard Law 
Review.34
As illustrated by Friedman’s argument and by the Medical Committee decision, the aggregate 
theory did not completely disappear from the scene. However, most commentators now regard as 
inconclusive, and even unhelpful, arguments for shareholder profit maximization based on the 
concept of ownership.35 In the first place, the metaphor of ownership does not reflect the legal 
relationship of shareholders to the corporation. In legal terms, shareholders are not the owners of 
the corporation.36 Rather, they own shares of the capital stock of the corporation, meaning that they 
30
 The Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 667 (1819) ( Story J. describing 
corporations as “collection[s] of individuals”); See also 1 STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF CORPORATIONS 13 (Garland Publishing Inc. 1978) (1793) (“A corporation then, or a body politic, or 
body incorporate, is a collection of many individuals, united into one body, ... and vested, by the policy of the 
law, with the capacity of acting, in several respects, as an individual, particularly of taking and granting 
property, of contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued ...”); see William W. Bratton, Jr., The 
“Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 424 (1989) 
(describing the aggregate theory); Allen, supra note 21, at 266-70 (describing this conception, which Allen 
refers to as the “property” conception); Morton Horwitz, Santa Clara revisited: The development of 
corporate theory, 88 W. VA. L.R. 173, 182 (1985).
31 See Horwitz, supra note 30, at 223; Bratton, supra note 30.
32
 For example, OTTO FRIEDRICH VON GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE 
(Frederic William Maitland trans., 1958) (1900).
33
 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507 (1919) (“A business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders”).
34 See A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (arguing 
that managers’ powers should be viewed as “exercisable only for the ratable benefit of the shareholders”); E. 
Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148, 1161 
(1932) (responding that the corporation was increasingly viewed as “an economic institution which has a 
social service as well as a profit-making function” and arguing that managers should consequently be 
permitted to conduct the corporation’s business “in a manner appropriate to a person practising a profession 
and imbued with a sense of social responsibility”). See also A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers 
Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932).
35 See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 
(2002); Allen, supra note 21, at 269; Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors 
of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1416 (1993) (“shareholders are not property 
owners”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to 
Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423,  1427 (1993) (agreeing with Green on this point); 
MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 5 (1995).
36 See Stout, supra note 35, at 1191.
9own choses in action giving them certain rights (determined by corporate law and the corporate 
charter) with respect to corporate governance and the assets of the corporation. These rights 
typically include the right to elect or remove the members of the board of directors,37 to approve or 
reject fundamental changes, such as mergers or amendments to the charter,38 and, if and when the 
corporation is ever liquidated, to receive whatever assets remain after all of the creditors have been 
paid.39 Importantly, however, shareholders have no property rights in the corporation’s assets: a 
shareholder of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., can be prosecuted for shoplifting from Wal-Mart. Moreover, 
they do not have the legal power to dispose of those assets or to direct management’s actions. 
Corporate law firmly vests this power in the board of directors40 and insulates the latter from direct 
interference by the shareholders.41
More fundamentally, the argument from ownership is unhelpful because it takes for granted 
that shareholders are analogous to owners, while obscuring the more pertinent inquiry into what 
grounds of analogy, if any, there are, between shareholders and property owners, and whether those 
grounds justify imposing a duty on the part of the management to maximize the shareholders’ 
profits. As William Allen put it, “the premise of ‘ownership’ simply assumes but does not justify 
an answer.”42
And so, the debate about profit maximization also takes place on a more pragmatic level, 
where the basic question is: is the power wielded by those who manage corporations better 
channeled by imposing legal duties to serve only the financial interests of shareholders or by 
requiring or permitting them also to consider the broader impact of their activity? In support of a 
broader duty, one can cite the harm to non-shareholder interests that may be caused by single-
minded profit maximization. In support of a narrower duty, it is argued that replacing profit 
maximization with a more amorphous goal of social responsibility effectively liberates 
management to pursue its own interests, under the guise of social responsibility, at the expense of 
shareholders and non-shareholders alike.43
The practical difference between these positions might be smaller than at first appears. On the 
one hand, as the proponents of profit maximization often point out, even a profit-maximizing firm 
will act responsibly to the extent that responsibility is a profit-enhancing strategy.44 On the other 
37 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(k); 211(b) (2004).
38 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242(b); 251(c) (2004).
39 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 281 (2004).
40 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2004).
41 Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 99 N.E. 138, 141 (N.Y. 1912);  Peter V. Letsou, Shareholder Voice and 
the Market for Corporate Control, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 755, 760-61 (1992) (detailing shareholders’ lack of 
power under state corporate law to direct corporate actions).
42
 Allen, supra note 21, at 269.
43
 Stout, supra note 35, at 1200; Friedrich A. Hayek, The Corporation in a Democratic Society: In Whose 
Interest Ought It and Will It Be Run?, in MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATIONS 1985 99, 100 (Melvin 
Anshen & George Leland Bach, eds., 1960) (arguing that management’s power can be limited only by 
confining it to a single goal, namely the maximization of profits); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy:  The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 
581 (2003); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991) (“a manager told to serve two masters (a little for the equity holders, a little 
for the community) has been freed of both and is answerable to neither”).
44 See Michael E. Murphy, Dispelling TINA’s ghost from the post-Enron corporate governance debate, 43 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63, 117 (2002); Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory, 43 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1629, 1639 (2002) (arguing that profit-seeking corporations refrain from opportunism to avoid 
increasing the costs of securing firm-specific investments from non-shareholders).
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hand, one must be careful not to overstate the constraining value of a legal duty upon management 
to maximize profits, especially in light of courts’ reluctance to second-guess management’s 
business judgment.45
Despite claims of victory by the proponents of profit maximization,46 the normative debate is 
inconclusive. To some, the debate may appear to be an as-yet unresolved empirical question,47
requiring a sufficiently ingenious policy analyst to measure and compare two types of social cost, 
namely the costs associated with increased managerial discretion, on the one hand, and the cost to 
non-shareholders of profit-maximizing activity minus shareholders’ benefit from the activity, on 
the other hand. In my view, however, the problem is not purely empirical, because the weighing of 
the two types of social cost ultimately depends on a value judgment rather than on an objective 
measurement.48
External versus internal constraints on profit maximization
As I have noted, the proponents of profit maximization take pains to argue that the profit-
maximizing corporation acts responsibly in spite of itself, much as Smith argued that individuals 
serve the public good indirectly by pursuing their self-interest in market transactions.49 It is argued, 
for example, that the interests of shareholders and non-shareholders are often aligned,50 both 
because in a profitable corporation the claims of creditors, employees and other non-shareholders 
are more secure51 and because cooperation is usually a profit-enhancing strategy when there are 
unlimited future periods.52 Moreover, as noted above, the demands of consumers and business 
partners for corporate social responsibility will often provide a profit-oriented reason for the 
corporation to act responsibly. If all else fails, external regulation – including legal liability – can 
be used as a method of aligning the interests of shareholders and the requirements of social 
45
 Bainbridge, supra note 43, at 582 (anticipating this argument and describing the profit maximization rule 
as nonetheless valuable as an “ever-present goad”); Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give 
at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the 
Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1225 (1999) (describing legal constraints on uneconomic
corporate philanthropy as “largely irrelevant”).
46
 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2. 
47
 Stout, supra note 35, 1201 (“the question ultimately cannot be answered except on the basis of empirical 
evidence”).
48
 The measurement of non-Pareto-improving changes in social welfare is virtually never purely empirical, 
because of the incommensurability of costs and benefits visited upon different people. 
49
 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
184 (J. Shield Nicholson intro., T. Nelson and Sons 1887) (1776) (“By pursuing his own interest [an 
individual] frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote 
it”).
50
 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate stakeholders: a contractual perspective, 43 U.T.L.J. 
401, 415 (1993); Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 1439 (“In most situations, shareholder and nonshareholder 
constituency interests coincide”); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 43 (“frequently the harmony of 
interest between profit maximization and other objectives escapes attention”).
51 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Employees: Participatory 
Management and Natural Law, 43 VILL. L. REV. 741, 828 (1998) (“A rising tide lifts all boats.”); 
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 43 (arguing that better working conditions and environmental 
quality accompany higher corporate profits); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 
VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1269 (1982) (argument along the same lines).
52 See Murphy, supra note 44. See also Meese, supra note 44.
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responsibility.53 Regulation and liability, the conditions of which are set through the political 
process, are said to be preferable to counting on managers to determine for themselves what social 
responsibility requires, a task for which managers lack both legitimacy and expertise.
In the final analysis, the debate is not so much about whether there should be limits on 
corporate profit maximization as about what form the limits should take. The question is whether 
the limits should be entirely external to the corporation—imposed upon the corporation by markets 
or by regulation—or whether there should also be internal limits—accommodated within corporate 
law.
There are, in my view, two unanswered arguments for the existence of at least some internal 
limits. The first argument is that there appears to be something ethically corrupt in the notion that 
one should do right only when one is compelled to do so or when it pays. Consider the case of a 
multinational manufacturer of data processing machinery that has a profitable line of business 
selling equipment and supplies to a genocidal dictator.54 If the managers decide to discontinue the 
line of business, should they be held to violate corporate law? Does the answer to the foregoing 
question depend solely on whether the profits from the activity are greater than the sum of the loss 
of business from socially conscious customers and the legal liability, if any, that management 
expects the corporation to incur as a result of its activity? We should have misgivings about a 
position that would answer these questions in the affirmative.
The second argument is that an exclusive reliance on external limits creates a situation where 
management’s duty to maximize corporate profits leads it to seek to influence external regulation, 
for example, through lobbying, political contributions or election advertising, to reduce the 
constraints on the pursuit of profits.55 These activities are socially harmful whenever the social 
interest and corporate profit maximization conflict. If there are no internal limits to profit 
maximization, legal compliance itself can become contingent — something which it is beyond 
management’s power to indulge in except to the extent that it would result in greater profits for the 
stockholders.56
These arguments point, in my view, to the desirability of some internal limits to the 
corporation’s mandate to maximize its profits, not as a substitute for but in addition to external 
regulation and the operation of markets. These well-known arguments cause even some prominent 
opponents of corporate social responsibility to back away from the implications of their position.57
We should also be careful not to accept too readily the claim that shareholder and social 
interests are aligned. That claim is based on the insight that, through the market mechanism, the 
people affected by corporate activity can cause the impact of corporate activity on them to be taken 
53
 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 442 (asserting that “the most efficacious legal mechanisms for 
protecting the interests of nonshareholder constituencies … lie outside of corporate law” in, for example, 
labor and employment law, consumer protection law, environmental law and tort law).
54 See EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE BETWEEN 
NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL CORPORATION (Crown Publishers 2001)
(examining IBM’s profitable business of selling machinery, design services, and supplies to the Third Reich).
55
 BAKAN, supra note 5, at 85 ch.4 (describing corporate efforts to free themselves of regulatory constraints 
on profit making). 
56 See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 51, at 1271 (describing legal non-compliance as privately advantageous for 
corporations and socially desirable where the corporation’s gains from the violation exceed the “social costs 
(as reflected in the penalty)”).
57
 For example, Friedman, supra note 26, at 33, acknowledges that corporate conduct should conform to “the 
basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.”
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into account by corporate decision-makers. If unsafe products adversely affect consumers’ 
interests, the consumers will not be willing to pay as much for the products or will simply purchase 
from competitors; if workplace harassment affects the interests of employees, the corporation is 
likely to face demands for higher wages or difficulty in retaining or attracting employees. 
The claim amounts to an expression of confidence in the ability of markets to determine the 
“right” amount of product safety, workplace respect and so on. As Coase taught us, markets can 
even determine the socially optimal quantity of pollution: the persons affected by pollution can 
offer to pay a polluter to discontinue it, and if the harm to the affected persons exceeds the 
polluters’ profits from the activity, the offer is likely to be accepted.58
Leaving aside the practical problems of negotiating costs, collective action and asymmetric 
information, there is another reason, of principle, not to rely solely on markets for the protection of 
the interests of non-shareholders. That reason is that a person’s ability to cause the corporation to 
internalize the costs incurred by him or her is in proportion to the person’s resources. This 
observation is a specific application of the more general observation that markets, as a 
clearinghouse for individual needs and preferences, weight those needs and preferences by the 
individual’s ability to pay. In concrete terms, the stockholders’ interests are likely to be more 
responsive to the desires of, for example, wealthy consumers in developed countries, than they are 
to even the urgent needs of the peasants who live downstream from the corporation’s factories in 
the Third World. 
I mention this last point, not because it unequivocally supports the case for internal limits to 
corporate profit maximization — external regulation may be equally or more appropriate — but 
simply to caution against complacent acceptance of the assertion that markets miraculously “align” 
the profits of shareholders with the interests of non-shareholders.
Profit maximization and the contractual conception of the corporation
The supporters of corporate profit maximization do not tend to be central-planners. Although 
they view the economic arguments for profit maximization as compelling, the implementation of 
their viewpoint in law requires additional reasoning. As we shall see, in this additional reasoning, it 
is crucially assumed that contractual participants, including shareholders, act exclusively out of 
self-interest.
The corporate contract
Since the middle of the last century, economists have emerged as the leading theorists of the 
corporation, and the “nexus of contracts,” or “contractarian” conception has become the dominant 
metaphor among academic corporate lawyers.59 The contractarian conception focuses on the 
microeconomic aspects of the arrangements entered into between the various participants in the 
corporation – shareholders, other investors, the board of directors, management, employees, 
58 See R.H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960); for this reasoning in action, see 
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 43, at 39 (in dealing with pollution “[the] task is to establish 
property rights so that the firm treats the social costs, and so that its reactions, as managers try to maximize 
profits …, duplicate what all of the parties (downstream users and customers alike) would have agreed to 
were bargaining among all possible without cost”).
59
 Allen, supra note 21, at 265 n.7 (describing the “contract metaphor” as the “dominant academic paradigm 
of the corporation”).
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suppliers, customers and so on. The corporation is merely the “nexus” of all of these voluntary 
arrangements, or “contracts,” as the legal economists refer to them.
The nexus-of-contracts conception has two ambitions: to interpret the conduct of corporate 
participants and to provide a normative justification for corporate law. 
Contractarians seek to rationalize the observed terms on which corporate participation occurs. 
They observe that a shareholder willingly purchases shares rather than keeping her money in a 
bank account or investing in real estate or bonds; that a manager chooses to work for a particular 
corporation rather than its competitor (or becoming a golf pro); that a supplier voluntarily provides 
goods and services to the corporation rather than to another customer. The terms on which each of 
these participants deals with the others (through the corporation) are determined through the 
operation of markets. The relative supply of and demand for equity capital determine the 
shareholders’ expected return on their investment and the other terms of their participation; the 
relative supply of and demand for the services of executives and line workers will determine their 
respective compensation levels; the relative supply of and demand for the other factors of 
production determine their prices and the terms on which they are supplied; and so on.
The contractarian reasons that, since people voluntarily invest and accept employment in 
corporations on the terms observed in practice, there must be some reason why it is in their interest 
to do so. Thus, for example, while scholars in the mid-20th century bemoaned the diminished 
control exercised by shareholders in widely-held corporations, contractarian analysis has sought, by 
contrast, to rationalize it. Why would shareholders agree to make equity investments in firms in the 
governance of which they could not practically participate? The answer posited by contractarians is 
that the separation of the functions of risk-bearing and management facilitates investment: 
Those who have wealth can employ it productively even if they are not good managers; those 
who can manage but lack wealth can hire capital in the market; and the existence of claims that 
can be traded separately from employment allows investors to diversify their investment 
interests … [, making] investment as a whole less risky and therefore … more attractive and 
more efficient.60
The price of these benefits is the divergence of interest between managers and suppliers of capital. 
The costs imposed by this divergence – termed “agency costs” – take the form of imperfectly loyal 
and less-than-diligent performance by management and the resulting impairment of firm 
profitability, together with costs incurred on behalf of the shareholders in monitoring 
management’s performance. In the contractarian view, dispersed shareholders willingly invest in 
corporations, despite having little or no control, when the benefits associated with the separation of 
risk- bearing and management exceed the agency costs. 
Contractarianism has a number of implications for the normative analysis of corporate law. 
First, the corporate contract draws on the justifications for the institution of contract more 
generally. As a means of allocating resources (or, with respect to a business venture, roles, risks 
and possible rewards), contract is attractive because of its characteristic respect for individual 
preferences and individual choice. Each party, by choosing to enter into a contract, demonstrates 
that he perceives that he is better off participating in the contract on its terms than pursuing any 
alternative course of conduct available to him. The same is true of participants in a business 
venture, including participants in a corporation.
60
 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 43, at 11. See also Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of 
the Corporation,  11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 99, 107 (1989).
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A second conclusion is that the imposition of mandatory terms is presumptively 
counterproductive because the overall balance of advantage in the transaction is determined by the 
parties’ endowments (including available alternatives) and preferences; the incorporation of a 
mandatory term merely creates the risk that, among various packages of terms reflecting the 
existing balance of advantage, the package both parties would have preferred will be excluded 
because it does not contain the mandated term. If the preferred package does not contain the 
mandated term, the mandatory character of the term defeats the parties’ common preference and is 
counterproductive. If the package preferred by both parties does contain the mandated term, then 
the mandatory character of the term is superfluous. This argument is well-known inside and outside 
corporate law;61 in corporate law, it informs the view that corporate law should be enabling, not 
mandatory.62 For instance, suggestions that greater participation by workers in corporate 
governance would be “more democratic” are met with the response that worker participatory rights 
would come at the expense of other worker benefits, and if we do not already see such rights 
provided for in labor agreements, it is because workers value these rights less than they value the 
benefits that would have to be sacrificed in order to obtain them.63
On the other hand, it is appropriate for the architects of corporate law to try to anticipate the 
terms which most participants in the corporation would reasonably be expected to settle on, and to 
include these in a corporations statute as “default terms,” to be applied to the corporation unless the 
original incorporators agree otherwise.64 By providing suitable default terms, a corporate law 
jurisdiction reduces the costs associated with negotiating and organizing an incorporated business 
venture.
From contractarianism to profit maximization
It should be clear that the contractual conception of the corporation does not entail the 
proposition that corporate management should be legally obligated to manage the corporation with 
a view to maximizing the stockholders’ profits. Shareholder profit maximization is not an essential 
feature of a contractual relationship. It is not even an essential feature of a contract of investment: 
no one would argue that management promises to maximize bondholders’ profits, for example. 
Yet, most contractarians argue that corporate law should contain a default rule requiring 
corporate management to maximize corporate profits and, thereby, the profits of the stockholders.65
Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, write:
61 See, e.g., 3-4 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW  363, 515-17 (5th ed., Aspen 
Law & Business 1998); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 
954-55 (1984); Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. 
L. REV. 879, 890 (1975); Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes 
and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 558 (1984).
62 See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law and Science in the Corporate Field: A Critique of 
Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1536-37 (1989) (“From the contractarian standpoint, provisions that 
cannot be overridden by private agreement are generally undesirable”).
63 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 43, at 21 (“one cannot tinker with one term in a 
contract confident that the change will make any party better off after other terms have been adjusted”); 
Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 720 (1988) 
(acknowledging that the parties are likely to “bargain around” legally imposed obligations to workers, 
resulting potentially in lower wages or in other terms ultimately less favorable for workers).
64 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 43, at 15, 34.
65
 A recent articulation of the argument is Bainbridge, supra note 43, at 577-79.
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The role of corporate law here, as elsewhere, is to adopt a background term that prevails unless 
varied by contract. And the background term should be the one that is either picked by contract 
expressly when people get around to it or is the operational assumption of successful firms. For 
most firms the expectation is that the residual riskbearers have contracted for a promise to 
maximize long-run profits of the firm, which in turn maximizes the value of their stock. Other 
participants contract for fixed payouts — monthly interest, salaries, pensions, severance 
payments, and the like.66
There is no evidence that “when people get around to it,” they choose to provide explicitly for 
a promise to maximize corporate profits.67 Therefore, Easterbrook and Fischel’s claim rests on the 
view that having a unique group of “risk-bearers” – the shareholders – to whom the other 
participants promise to maximize the corporation’s profits, is an ingredient of a “successful firm.” 
Easterbrook and Fischel do not say why shareholder profit maximization is an ingredient of 
“success.” One possibility is that success is intended as simply another word for profit, but this 
seems improbable, as it would make Easterbrook and Fischel’s argument circular. Instead, 
Easterbrook and Fischel’s reference to “successful firms” was likely included for its Darwinian 
overtones. Without a promise to maximize corporate profits, agency costs and unprofitable 
activities would be a drag on the corporation’s financial performance. Firms that permit potential 
cost reductions to go unrealized or that indulge in unprofitable activities are unlikely to survive in a 
competitive market.68 By contrast, firms in which the participants are focused on profits and adopt 
arrangements that keep agency costs to a minimum will be “successful,” not only because they will 
survive, but because their practices will be emulated by other firms. 
A slightly different argument holds that a venture is worth more in aggregate if there is a single 
group of residual claimants, because of the reduction in agency costs compared to a venture in 
which there are multiple residual claimants.69 Whatever the other participants forgo in having to 
settle for fixed claims is more than compensable out of the enhanced value of the arrangement for 
the sole residual claimants. It follows that if all of the participants are acting rationally and in their 
own interest, they will agree that (a) one of the groups (let us call them shareholders) will enjoy the 
status of sole residual claimant; (b) management’s powers should be exercised towards the end of 
maximizing the value of the shareholders’ investment; and (c) the other participants will receive 
fixed terms that compensate them prospectively for agreeing to (a) and (b). 
These two arguments share the same basic point. All of the participants in the corporation 
maximize their expected gain from the venture if they agree, in advance, to designate one group 
with homogeneous interests to be pursued exclusively. If profit is the goal of the venture, the 
maximizing strategy is for this group (let us call them the shareholders) to be entitled to the 
66
 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 43, at 36.
67
 Stout, for example, points out that corporate charters never explicitly provide for shareholder primacy. See
Stout, supra note 35, at 1207.
68
 Survival is a recurring theme in Easterbrook and Fischel’s writing. See, for example, EASTERBROOK & 
FISCHEL, supra note 43, at 4, 32, 71, 218; Easterbrook and Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 691 (arguing that corporate law rules that “survive” 
interjurisdictional competition are those that are beneficial to investors); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. 
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 857, 881 (repeated use of “survival” 
metaphor in discussion of utility of corporate policies against insider trading).
69
 Compare Macey & Miller, supra note 50, who argue that the reason for exclusive duties to maximize the 
value of the shareholders’ claim is that the aggregate value of a duty of loyalty, to the members of a 
particular group, decrease as the number of groups to whom the duty is owed increases; and shareholders (as 
a group) value the duty more than any other group, because non-shareholder constituencies can more 
effectively protect their interests through contracts or regulatory activity.
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residual profit from the venture, with the other participants receiving fixed returns on their 
contributions. This is because a less clear mandate or a more complicated promise requiring the 
interests of two or more disparate groups to be balanced against one another, would impair the 
firm’s overall wealth creating potential, creating a dead-weight loss. To believe that the corporate 
participants would choose to structure their arrangement to avoid this dead-weight loss requires, of 
course, the assumption that the participants prefer, all other things being equal, to have more 
(expected) wealth rather than less. This is not, in my view, a very demanding assumption. 
However, it is important to recognize that the argument also rests on a highly abstract, stylized 
picture of the way in which a business venture is likely to affect the participants’ interests. It also 
assumes that the participants, if fully rational, are ruthlessly self-interested and, consequently, do 
not care about the impact of the venture on non-participants.
Reality intrudes in two ways, in particular, that lead me to question the appropriateness of 
presuming that corporate participants have agreed in advance to the pursuit of profit to the 
exclusion of all other considerations. In the first place, there is no reason to believe that an 
exclusive profit motive is always necessary for the survival of a firm. That being the case, the range 
of default rules compatible with the firm’s survival includes rules that would qualify the pursuit of 
stockholder profit depending on the circumstances and the other interests at stake. It is not clear 
that we have reason to presume that the corporate participants would opt to exclude all ethical or 
other considerations not designed to increase the firm’s chances of survival under hypothesized 
conditions of perfect competition. To vary the metaphor, we should not presume that people adopt 
for ordinary life the standard of conduct they think would be most conducive to their survival on an 
overfull lifeboat.
In the second place, it may be uneconomical to compensate non-shareholders ex ante for 
damage to their interests that might arise as a result of shareholder profit-maximizing activity, to 
the extent that the damage relates to unlikely, but high-stakes events or to other risks that are 
difficult to estimate. Fully rational, risk-averse non-shareholders may require a level of fixed 
compensation for exposure to high-stakes losses such that it would make more sense for the parties 
simply to agree that the profit maximization norm will not be applied if it exposes non-shareholders 
to such losses.70 We might also worry that the non-shareholders have underestimated the risks, as it 
seems human beings are wont to do.71 As a result, it seems unrealistic to take for granted that non-
shareholders have agreed to assume all risks to which an unrestricted profit-maximizing norm 
exposes them, let alone that they have been fully compensated ex ante. 
I might add that the explicit or implied understandings of voluntary corporate participants are 
incapable of justifying a standard of corporate behavior that precludes independent consideration of 
the impact of corporate activities on persons who are not in a voluntary relationship with the 
corporation. Thus, for example, even assuming that Union Carbide’s employees bargain for what 
they receive, the same cannot be said for the thousands of other inhabitants of Bhopal.72
70
 Proponents of unqualified profit maximization argue that the parties might have agreed to such a 
qualification explicitly if they had wanted it; yet they could equally easily have made explicit an unqualified 
commitment to maximize stockholder profits. The parties’ silence is no reason to assume that they meant that 
the pursuit of shareholder profit maximization should be unqualified.
71 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1524-25 (1998), and the literature referred to in n.152 therein (suggesting that 
individuals tend to underestimate the likelihood that bad events will happen to them). Id at 1524. 
72
 A similar argument arises in the context of limited liability. Some have questioned limited liability in the 
case of tort claimants on the ground that, even if parties in a voluntary relationship with the corporation have 
explicitly or impliedly accepted limited liability, the same cannot be said of tort claimants, who are 
“involuntary creditors.” See Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder 
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However, even leaving aside the interests of non-participants in the corporation, I do not 
believe that we have reason to presume that the participants in the “corporate contract” have agreed 
that the mandate to maximize profits should be unqualified.
Part II — Shareholder responsibility and “bounded empathy”
“There is no such thing to my mind … as an innocent stockholder. He may be innocent in 
fact, but socially he cannot be held innocent. He accepts the benefits of the system.”
—- Louis Brandeis73
It is not difficult to see why shareholders’ sense of responsibility might be engaged by the 
activities of the corporation in which they have invested. It is not necessary that shareholders 
perceive themselves as “owners” of the corporation, as the Medical Committee did.74 It is sufficient 
that when the corporation harms third parties, it does so for the purpose of earning profits for the 
stockholders, and that shareholders invest willingly, thereby voluntarily assuming their role as the 
beneficiaries of the corporation’s activities. As such, they incur some responsibility for the impact 
of those activities.
It may be idealistic, but not unreasonably so, to hope that shareholders would care about the 
ethical implications of their investment decisions. This is not to deny that the main purpose of 
investing, for most people, is to achieve personal financial goals (i.e., to make money). Even 
people whose main goal is to profit financially from their investment will, one would expect, at 
least sometimes be influenced in their decisions by non-financial aspects of their investment. To 
draw an analogy, the fact that the main purpose of a car is to provide transportation between any 
two points A and B does not mean that when purchasing a car, suitability for transportation is the 
sole criterion; or that in operating a car—in deciding whether to accelerate, brake or turn—the sole 
consideration is whether the passengers and cargo are brought more quickly to point B. Car buyers 
may care about creating jobs domestically or rewarding a local dealership’s sponsorship of an 
amateur hockey team. A driver may swerve to avoid a pedestrian at least in part, one hopes, in 
order to avoid harming that person and not only because a collision would make the driver late. 
Similarly, even individuals whose main purpose in investing in shares is to provide for their 
retirement may be influenced by the knowledge that that the issuer of the shares earns some portion 
of its profits from, say, the sale of tobacco to children, and such investors may rationally be 
influenced by this factor in their investment decision. 
But there are reasons why they might not. Behavioral economists have reminded us that people 
are “boundedly rational.”75 I want to suggest that people are, similarly, characterized by “bounded
empathy.” For example, the geographic remoteness of the victims of corporate irresponsibility 
dulls our empathy in this setting,76 while the opacity of the corporate world somehow tricks us into 
forgetting that the corporation’s activities are undertaken for our benefit as shareholders. 
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879; and Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, An Economic 
Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 148-49 (1980) (advocating 
directorial liability toward involuntary creditors).
73
 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, On Industrial Relations, in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS 
PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 70, 75 (Osmond K. Frankel ed., 1965) (1934). 
74 See supra text accompanying note 27.
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 Mitchell argues that “separation and distance” diminish executives’ empathy for those harmed by corporate 
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18
Moreover, many people’s sense of responsibility is attenuated because of the miniscule 
practical influence that any individual shareholder expects to have over that activity. We may 
understand this as an instance of the well-known collective action problem that plagues large 
groups, whereby no individual “rationally” acts in the way that would serve the interests of the 
group, in part because the individual’s action, taken in isolation, has only a negligible impact on the 
group’s success.77 While I am not persuaded that this logic succeeds in absolving us, as 
shareholders, of responsibility for corporate actions undertaken for our benefit and with which we 
are voluntarily associated, I acknowledge that it may, in practice, account for our inertia.
We do not know, ultimately, to what extent shareholders invest conscientiously, although there 
are reasons to be cautious about overly optimistic intuitions.78
That said, one should not interpret the fact that shareholders’ conduct often deviates in practice 
from a fully conscientious ideal as necessarily providing comfort to the contractarian argument that 
shareholders should be presumed to demand unqualified profit maximization as a term of the 
corporate bargain. I argue for the interpretation of thoughtless conduct as reflecting the 
boundedness of empathy, not an endorsement of selfishness as a principle. In drawing up terms ex 
ante for the corporate venture, we should not assume that an individual would want the terms to 
reflect his or her situational weaknesses rather than his or her ideals.79
Moreover, it may be useful, in understanding the position being advocated here, to recall the 
competing views of human nature that Stephen Bainbridge ascribes to “conservatives” and 
“progressives.” According to Bainbridge, himself a self-described conservative: 
The basic bone of contention between conservative and progressive scholars … remains the old 
problem of the perfectibility of human nature. Conservatives blame human misery on causes 
which lurk naturally within the souls of men: pride, vanity, jealousy, greed, and insatiable or 
unruly desires. Conservatives are skeptical about the prospect of human perfectibility and 
suspicious of utopian projects, mostly because they must be “conducted by imperfect . . . 
human beings, [who are] always dangerously unfit to remake the world.” In contrast, 
progressives “believe that education, positive legislation, and alteration of environment can 
Smith famously made a more general point when he wrote that even catastrophic harm to “a hundred 
millions” of people far away moves any of us far less than a “paltry misfortune” to ourselves. See A. SMITH, 
THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, ¶ III.I.46 (1759). 
77 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 44 (1971). 
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produce men like gods; they deny that humanity has a natural proclivity toward violence and 
sin.”80
According to Bainbridge, this difference of opinion leads progressives to favor a regulatory 
approach to corporate law, under which good conduct would be legally defined and enforced, 
whereas conservatives, who believe that regulators are as imperfect as the rest of us, advocate 
private ordering. 
Like Bainbridge’s conservatives, I do not deny that human nature is, in practice, not 
perfectible. This article does not call into question the merits of private ordering, nor does it 
advocate the regulation of corporate relationships by the state. My argument is that we should not 
design corporate law in a way that cannot comprehend and accommodate the exercise by 
individuals of our ethical faculties, however infrequently or frequently it may occur. In the next 
Part, I criticize the approach taken by several leading economic theorists of the corporation towards 
the concept of ethical shareholder decision-making, as suffering from precisely this failing.
Part III — The responsible investor and the economic interpretation of the 
corporation
The responsible investor and the corporate contract
The normative grounding of the “nexus of contracts” approach in respect for individual 
preferences and individual choice suggests that in the exercise of their contractual freedom parties, 
including shareholders, may be governed by whatever motivations operate upon them, the ethical 
or altruistic no less than the selfish. This point is recognized implicitly by Easterbrook and Fischel, 
who write:
If the New York Times is formed to publish a newspaper first and make a profit second, no one 
should be allowed to object. Those who came in at the beginning actually consented…81
What goes for the original incorporator is equally valid for anyone making a decision whether to 
invest in the corporation. A purchaser of shares in the secondary market is no less free to make the 
decision based on ethical rather than self-interested grounds than was the person who decided 
originally to supply the corporate enterprise with equity capital.
Contractarians should also be opposed to interference with the exercise of acquired contractual 
rights, since such interference tampers with a bargain that both parties desired when it was made 
and therefore compromises people’s ability to make voluntary exchanges of binding commitments. 
Thus, an investor exercising her contractual rights, for example in voting her shares or in selling 
them to a willing buyer, may make her decision on whatever grounds she sees fit, whether 
congenial or objectionable to the other participants and without interference from “strangers to the 
bargain.” In the exercise of her rights, the investor is not bound to have regard to her fellow 
investors’ interests; still less is she bound to have regard only to her own.
However, in spite of contractarianism’s neutrality with respect to investor motivation, socially 
responsible investing is awkward for some economic theorists of the corporation because it 
80
 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive 
Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 856, 886-87 (1997). 
81
 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 43, at 36.
20
contradicts the assumption of investor singlemindedness that informs the normative argument for 
internally unconstrained shareholder profit maximization. As I explain below, these theorists 
typically respond to ethical investing either by dismissing it as an aberration or else by 
recharacterizing it as self-interested and potentially pernicious.
Socially responsible investors versus “true investors”
To some economic theorists of corporate law, social investors are not “true investors.” For 
example, Daniel Fischel claimed that “[p]rohibiting sensitive payments and having a clean 
environment are undoubtedly of great interest to some, but not to investors qua investors,”82 while 
Henry Manne responded, equally dismissively, to an author who argued that investors were 
interested in both profit and social justice:
It is difficult to reconcile [that author’s] two statements about shareholder motivation. When 
[he] refers to shareholders wanting to make money, he is probably referring to the mass of true 
investors …. When he refers to shareholders who want to make social policy, he is then talking 
about himself and company.83
It is difficult to know what to make of Fischel and Manne’s statements, which amount to bare 
assertions that an exclusive profit motive is intrinsic to the concept of an investor. It is not clear 
why this must be so. It is true that economists’ models of the corporation and of capital markets 
assume that shareholders are interested only in wealth and risk avoidance.84 But deviations in 
reality from this assumption call into question the validity or robustness of the models, rather than 
the credentials of the shareholders concerned. All models, we know, are simplifications. 
Simplification has its uses, but scholars must be careful not to mistake the model for reality, not to 
“[reconstruct] the world to fit the theory,” to use Wishart’s phrase.85
The likelihood is that Manne does not believe that any particular policy prescription flows from 
his assertion that socially responsible investors are not “true investors.”86 Manne is well-known for 
his deregulatory approach to corporate and securities law, believing that the market for corporate 
control protects investors from an inefficient or self-serving management better than can 
82
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governmental regulation.87 Presumably, he would rely on the same mechanisms to protect “true 
investors” from social activist shareholders. 
As for Fischel, his view that such individuals’ social concerns do not arise in their capacity as 
investors presumably informs his belief that the terms of the investment should include, by default, 
the “usual” commitment to profit maximization unless all of the original investors agree otherwise 
at the outset.88 Socially responsible investors cannot vary unilaterally the corporation’s objective 
after the fact. In defending this view, Fischel does not need, of course, to persuade us of the 
importance of honoring bargains; but he does need to give us a reason to presume that corporate 
participants have agreed to be bound to a norm of exclusive profit maximization, even when (as is 
always the case) they have not explicitly agreed to the term. He needs to persuade us to reject all 
other possible presumed bargains, especially those according to which profit maximization would 
be bounded by ethics and social responsibility. As I have argued, this case has not been made out. 
Simply asserting that social and ethical considerations are extraneous to investment does not prove 
that they are.
A taste for social responsibility?
A second typical response is to adopt a conception of self-interest broad enough to 
accommodate social preferences and altruism, and then to “proceed as usual.”89 On this approach, 
“socially responsible” portfolio selection amounts to a consumption decision, by which those 
investors who are so inclined willingly sacrifice financial returns to obtain some other desired 
benefit, such as the promotion of a particular social cause or even the provision of material aid to a 
favored stakeholder group.90
The “soft” version of rational choice theory reflected in this approach is not without its 
detractors from within the neoclassical tradition; these detractors argue that opening up the concept 
of self-interest to include altruism and other unselfish values makes the hypothesis of self-interest 
tautological.91 To adopt an inclusive conception of self-interest amounts, in other words, to a 
concession of defeat.
This concern aside, an inclusive approach to self-interest entails indifference to socially 
responsible portfolio selection by individual shareholders. 
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But while indifferent to socially responsible portfolio selection, defenders of an inclusive 
egoism take a dim view of socially responsible investors’ attempts to influence corporate behavior, 
for example through advocacy and shareholder proposals. For if social investors’ aims are properly 
thought of as self-interested, then investor activism is pernicious because it seeks to divert the 
resources of the firm – which are supposed to be used for the benefit of all of the shareholders – to 
satisfy the activists’ own taste for social responsibility. The following statement by Milton 
Friedman exemplifies this position:
[Concerning the] phenomenon of calling upon stockholders to require corporations to exercise 
social responsibility[, … in] most of these cases, what is in effect involved is some 
stockholders trying to get other stockholders (or customers or employees) to contribute against 
their will to ‘social’ causes favored by the activists. Insofar as they succeed, they are again 
imposing taxes and spending the proceeds.92
Daniel Fischel’s take on social shareholder activism is along similar lines:
[L]et us assume a corporation decides to modify its behavior—say, discontinuing investment in 
South Africa or ceasing manufacture of war munitions—in direct response to a defeated 
[shareholder] proposal.  While reformers would no doubt be ecstatic about this result, 
shareholders as a class have little to be excited about. What has occurred is that a tiny minority, 
subsidized by the vast majority of shareholders, has caused the corporation to abandon a 
wealth-maximizing strategy favored by the very majority of shareholders who are forced to 
provide the subsidy. A less “democratic” result or one more inconsistent with the goal of 
maximizing shareholders’ welfare is hard to find.93
It is not clear to me that the “vast majority” of shareholders are all that vulnerable, something 
that becomes apparent when their situation is compared to that of the silent political majorities of 
public choice theory.94 To a greater extent than political electorates, shareholders can vote with 
their feet. Shareholders’ ability to terminate at will their relationship with the corporation and place 
their capital elsewhere severely limits their susceptibility to “exploitation” at the hands of a socially 
responsible minority.95
There is, in addition, a more fundamental objection to the conceptualization of social 
responsibility as a “taste.” Although I do not wish to engage the philosophical debate over 
egoism,96 there seems to be something counterintuitive in the beliefs that are necessary to defend
the egoist thesis that underlies this conceptualization. One has to believe, implausibly in my view, 
that there is no moral difference between caring for others and caring for one’s self and that the 
concept of right has no meaning apart from “good for me.” If there is a sensible distinction between 
unselfish and self-interested motivation, then responsible investing is not best understood as an act 
92
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of consumption, but as an act of conscience. On this view, advocacy by socially responsible 
investors need not be interpreted as rent-seeking behavior. It may instead represent an effort to 
engage the ethical faculties of managers and fellow shareholders, or an attempt to persuade them 
by argument; or it may simply be “moral entrepreneurship,”97 an attempt to increase managers and 
shareholders’ empathy through arational persuasion. 
Conclusion to Part III
Corporate law should, at worst, be indifferent to socially responsible investing. Yet, some 
corporate law scholarship disparages socially responsible investing because it conflicts with the 
assumption of investor self-interest that underlies, among other things, the normative argument for 
corporate profit maximization. The response of some scholars, to exceptionalize socially 
responsible investing or to recast it as self-serving, is misguided. We should not be so blinded by 
our own model that we are incapable of dealing with departures from it in reality, nor so committed 
to the assumption of self-interest that we are incapable of comprehending conscience.
Let me not be mistaken for an optimist. The available evidence does not permit one to be 
confident that all, or even very many investors have a keen sense of social responsibility.98 But I do 
suggest that this fact may have more to do with the “boundedness” of empathy than it reflects upon 
the irrelevance of empathy or ethical judgment to the act of investing. Furthermore, when we 
encounter exceptions to the model, we should acknowledge the model’s limitations rather than 
reinterpreting, as selfish, a person’s use of her empathetic and ethical faculties, when they occur. 
The risk, for us, is that reality will come to conform still more to the model, and we would all be 
the poorer for it.99
Part IV — Concrete questions
Socially responsible investing is a neglected topic in the corporate law literature,100 except for 
two issues: (1) whether the proxy mechanism should be available to circulate, at corporate expense, 
proposals by shareholders on matters of social responsibility; and (2) whether disclosure of certain 
information relative to the corporation’s “social performance” should be made mandatory.101 In this 
Part, I will comment on the implications of my analysis for these two issues. 
97
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I begin, however, with a more fundamental question, namely whether management should be
permitted, or even required, to modify its behavior in response to or in anticipation of the actions of 
socially responsible shareholders.
Corporate management and the socially responsible shareholder
There is little controversy in the notion that corporate management may employ corporate 
resources in a “socially responsible” manner if irresponsibility would impact negatively on the 
corporation’s profitability, for example by causing the defection of customers, suppliers or 
employees, or by attracting legal liability or external regulation. Even the hardest-core advocates of 
shareholder primacy recognize the legitimacy of this kind of social responsibility.102
It is a different question whether management can act responsibly in order to avoid defections 
by socially responsible shareholders. On one formulation of the stockholder profit maximization 
rule, management’s responsibility is construed as an obligation to maximize the stock price. 
Presumably, such an obligation would require the avoidance of conduct that makes the corporation 
unattractive to large numbers of existing or potential shareholders.
According to another view, management’s responsibility should not be to maximize the stock 
price, which represents only the intersection of supply of and demand for the corporation’s equity 
capital, but rather to maximize the total value of the enterprise. As discussed in Part I, many 
economic analysts believe that reasonable corporate participants would organize their venture such 
that the total value of the enterprise would be maximized by the maximization of a single residual 
claim — the value of the shareholders’ interests — but even this is not the same thing as 
maximizing the stock price. 
Ultimately, however, this may be something of a moot point as the reality seems to be that 
even substantial defections of shareholders because of social responsibility concerns have a 
negligible impact on the stock price.103
Another issue concerns the manager’s own ethical responsibilities. It is, as I have argued, an 
open question whether the law authorizes management to act ethically in a non-instrumental sense, 
i.e., for reasons other than the impact that the particular conduct would have on the corporation’s 
profitability. On a normative level, I have argued that the better view is that management should be 
permitted to act ethically, for several reasons. For one thing, the affirmative argument for exclusive 
profit maximization rests on a presumed bargain among highly stylized hypothetical bargainers. 
Moreover, the negative argument — that a more vague mandate is insufficiently constraining of 
management — overlooks the relatively weak contribution that a profit maximization rule would 
102
 For example, Milton Friedman has acknowledged that social responsibility is legitimate when it is a 
means to the end of maximizing shareholders’ wealth: see BAKAN, supra note 5, at 34 (describing interview 
with Friedman).
103
 The theoretical explanation is as follows. For investors who are concerned only with risk and return, all 
securities are perfect substitutes, and all of these investors would be available to take up the slack left by the 
defection of even a significant number of shareholders from one security. Consequently, as long as the very 
large majority of investors in the market are “socially indifferent,” the defection of even significant numbers 
of investors from any particular stock can be expected to be compensated by an immediate influx of capital 
from socially indifferent investors, with no material impact on the stock price. For a empirical study, see 
Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch & C. Paul Wazzan, The Effect of Socially Activist Investment Policies on the 
Financial Markets: Evidence from the South African Boycott, 72 J. OF BUS. 35 (1999) (divestment had 
“little discernible effect” on the cost of capital of firms doing business in South Africa). 
25
make to constraining management compared to other mechanisms, such as the stock market. This
is to say nothing of the anomalous character of a position that would hold, for example, that the 
management of a U.S. corporation would violate its corporate law duties by discontinuing 
supplying equipment to a genocidal dictatorship, in the absence of reasons connected to profit.
In consequence, I conclude that corporate law should not preclude ethical behavior by 
management even if it qualifies the goal of maximizing profits. In the exercise of managers’ ethical 
faculties, the views of shareholders are, in my view, relevant because the shareholders have money 
at stake in a departure from profit maximization: the profits would otherwise be for their benefit. 
Shareholder social proposals
Pursuant to Rule 14a-8 under the Exchange Act of 1934,104 an eligible shareholder is entitled to 
require that management include in the annual proxy circular, sent to shareholders at the 
corporation’s expense, a “proposal” submitted by the shareholder together with a brief supporting 
statement. The idea underlying Rule 14a-8 was that management’s proxy circular would be 
misleadingly incomplete if it omitted information about a matter that a shareholder proposed to 
raise at the general meeting.105
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, activist shareholders in the United States “discovered” the 
possibilities offered by Rule 14a-8. Two famous uses of Rule 14a-8 involved Dow Chemical and 
General Motors. In 1968, the Medical Committee for Human Rights received a gift of five shares 
in the Dow Chemical Corporation, and submitted a proposal calling for Dow’s charter to be 
amended so as to restrict the sale of napalm.106 Although Dow’s management initially balked at 
including the proposal, and the SEC upheld management’s refusal to include a slightly revised 
proposal by the Medical Committee in 1969, the Medical Committee won review before the D.C. 
Circuit and Dow decided to include the resolution in 1971, while its appeal was pending before the 
Supreme Court. Contemporaneously, a shareholder group led by Ralph Nader and owning twelve 
shares in General Motors submitted a series of proposed resolutions on issues that included product 
safety and environmental impact and minority board representation.107 Two of these resolutions 
ultimately were included in the proxy circular, and although neither of the resolutions obtained as 
much as 3 per cent support, one concrete result of the campaign was GM’s appointment of the Rev. 
Leon Sullivan to its board of directors.108
Since then, shareholders’ use of the proxy mechanism to make social responsibility proposals 
has expanded dramatically. In the 2004 proxy season, according to Institutional Shareholder 
Services, shareholders filed 270 social responsibility proposals,109 and approximately one-quarter 
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of all shareholder proposals were on social responsibility matters.110 Many social proposals are 
withdrawn before reaching a vote, often following negotiations with management. Proposals that 
do reach a vote are almost always defeated by the shareholders by overwhelming margins, 111
particularly if, as it usually does, management has recommended that shareholders vote against the 
resolution.
Shareholder social proposals come in for strong criticism by many economic theorists of 
corporate law. Roberta Romano has denounced social proposals as hostile to the “objective of U.S. 
corporate law,” i.e., the maximization of corporate profits.112 Henry Manne, Frank Easterbrook and 
Daniel Fischel have characterized social proposals as an attempt by activist critics of the 
corporation to obtain publicity at corporate expense, meaning (ultimately) at the expense of 
shareholders generally.113
It must be said that, for many opponents of social shareholder proposals, the shareholder 
proposal mechanism itself (never mind proposals directed at social responsibility) seems 
anomalous.114 For one thing, the mechanism is in tension with the separation of ownership and 
control, which economic theorists of the corporation believe produces gains through the 
specialization of functions.115 Moreover, shareholders have no reason to vote on a shareholder 
proposal, or for that matter any other matter submitted to shareholders,116 since they rationally have 
no expectation that their vote will be pivotal. For both of these reasons, economic theorists of the 
corporation typically have difficulty accounting for the existence of a shareholder proposal 
mechanism.
 I do not have the same discomfort with the shareholder proposal mechanism, particularly as it 
relates to shareholder social proposals. In analyzing the issue, it is useful to reflect separately on 
two questions: first, whether there is any reason for shareholders to vote on matters of corporate 
social responsibility; and, second, if the answer to the first question is affirmative, whether the 
proxy mechanism should be available for communication on such matters.
In answer to the first question, I refer to my argument, above, that shareholders have an ethical 
stake in the conduct of the business, as they occupy voluntarily the position of ultimate 
beneficiaries of that conduct. A shareholder, in the exercise of her responsibilities, may wish to 
dissociate herself from unethical conduct by supporting a proposal recommending its 
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discontinuance; or to participate in collective shareholder action aimed at influencing the conduct. 
For these reasons a shareholder may not be content to abstain from providing input on the ethical 
management of the corporation. The expectation of non-pivotality provides reasons not to vote, but 
not overriding reasons if an individual values the opportunity to participate in or dissociate herself 
from a collective activity. In any event, the paradox of voting is probably more of a challenge for 
rational choice theory than an argument against the shareholder franchise, just as no one takes the 
paradox to be an argument for the abolition of elections in the political sphere.117
The answer to the second question turns on whether the dissemination of the relevant 
communications is beneficial to the shareholders as a whole, in which case the costs should be 
subsidized by the corporation, or only to the proposing shareholder, in which case the costs should 
not be subsidized. Arguments against shareholder social proposals tend to presuppose that the 
communications are of no benefit to shareholders as a whole,118 but I am not so certain. By 
enabling informed shareholders to alert others to possible sources of ethical concern in relation to 
their investment, the mechanism reduces the costs of gathering and analyzing this information for 
all shareholders. 
My support for the availability of the proxy mechanism for shareholder social proposals is also 
influenced by two other factors. The first is that the costs are modest: Alan Palmiter estimated in 
1994 that corporations spent an aggregate of $15-million in dealing with Rule 14a-8 proposals, and 
the SEC estimated its own costs at one staff-year.119 The second is that although some proportion of 
the other shareholders may, upon reading the communication, conclude that the information does 
not affect their own investment decision, little harm will have been done because the 
communications are brief120 and shareholders are not prevented from voting against the proposed 
resolution. There may, of course, be some shareholders who feel that no communication on social 
matters will ever be of interest to them. If they were sufficiently numerous,121 however, one would 
expect to see states enacting legal provisions authorizing or requiring corporations to exclude 
shareholder resolutions on social matters.122
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Mandatory social disclosure
Cynthia Williams has been a prominent advocate of the position that the SEC should adopt 
rules requiring “social disclosure” by public corporations, including disclosure of the corporation’s 
pattern of compliance with domestic and foreign law and of information concerning employment 
practices and the earning of income from “controversial products.”123 Williams argues that such 
information is relevant both to the purely economic aspect of an investment decision — because a 
company’s social and environmental practices can affect its profitability — and to investors’ social 
concerns.
I agree with an important premise of Williams’ argument — the rejection of a 
compartmentalization of human values which would deny the relevance of social considerations to 
an investment decision. I also acknowledge that making “social disclosure” mandatory might have 
some beneficial impact; for example, it may increase investors’ empathetic engagement to a level 
that has not been achieved by leaving investors to their own devices. 
However, I have some misgivings about mandatory social disclosure that I do not have in 
relation to shareholder social responsibility proposals.  These misgivings relate to the fact that there 
is a market in social information. People who are interested in social information can currently 
obtain it from commercial social information services or can invest in mutual funds that add value 
in part by obtaining and analyzing information about corporations’ social impact.124 Although some 
investors are interested in social information, others are not, and those who are interested in social 
information vary in the value they attach to the disclosure and in the types of social information 
they value. The characteristics of supply — notably the cost of collecting and communicating the 
information — and investors’ demand for the information determine the amount, type and quality 
of the information that is produced. Williams’ proposal amounts to a suggestion that this 
determination should instead be made by the SEC.
The debate about mandatory social disclosure is a variant of the more general debate about 
mandatory disclosure by capital-raising corporations. In this debate, an important argument against 
mandatory disclosure is that the operation of the capital market in any event ensures that 
corporations disclose information valued by investors.125 In this connection, it is worth noting that 
even largely unregulated securities offerings, such as offshore or institutional offerings, are 
typically accompanied by extensive disclosures by the issuer. The type and amount of information 
disclosed voluntarily will, of course, deviate from the ideal, especially to the extent that the 
information would be useful to third parties (for example, shareholders in other corporations in the 
same industry)126 or that managers’ incentives are not perfectly responsive to the preferences of 
investors as revealed in the capital market. However, some information that is not forthcoming 
directly from issuers but that is valued by investors is likely to be provided by analysts and other 
private actors.127 Opponents of mandatory disclosure claim that the mix of information resulting 
shareholder social resolutions and spare corporations the expense of circulating them, it casts doubt on the 
proposition that investors are ill served by the status quo.
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from voluntary and third-party disclosure is likely to more faithfully reflect what investors want 
(and are willing to pay for) and, therefore, be more successful than a regulator’s assessment of the 
optimal type, quality and quantity of information.
This well-known and influential argument in the more general debate has not been adequately 
addressed by the proponents of mandatory social disclosure. Williams, in particular, while arguing 
that social information is relevant to investors, does not explain why the type, quality and amount 
of social information currently produced in the market does not adequately reflect its value to 
investors. 
A good argument can often be made for regulatory adjustment of market outcomes based on a 
market failure, such as a collective action problem. For instance, proponents of mandatory 
disclosure sometimes argue that, in the absence of a disclosure obligation, information valued by 
all shareholders would be underproduced because none of them would be willing to bear, alone, the 
costs of obtaining information that can then be used, for free, by everyone.128 This argument 
applies, however, only to information the shareholders would have to obtain from third parties and 
not to information that the corporation can produce and provide to investors itself.129 Moreover, if 
information were being substantially underproduced because of its “public goods” aspect, one 
would expect to observe some potential purchasers of social information instead obtaining it 
second-hand without paying for it. I doubt that free-riding by social investors is the reason why the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center and other similar providers do not have more customers.
Another possible collective action problem relates to the desirability of standards for social 
information that would enable comparisons between companies.130 This argument, too, is made in 
support of mandatory disclosure generally,131 the idea being that no firm can capture the full benefit 
of any investment it might make in developing comparable measures of performance because the 
measures could be copied by other firms without compensation. There is something to this 
argument, which might support public investment in the creation of a standard for disclosure.132
However, the argument falls short of explaining why the disclosure itself should be mandatory 
rather than optional. 
Another argument is that, in the absence of a mandatory regime, no corporation is likely to
move first in producing and disclosing social information. Potential first-movers will be dissuaded 
by the fear of being singled out for criticism by investors (and consumers) even though other 
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corporations have equally poor, or worse, social performance.133 Although this argument might 
appear, at first glance, to describe a collective action problem, it is in reality a claim about bounded 
investor rationality. The underlying assumption is that investors are under a misapprehension that 
corporate profits are made in an acceptable manner and will misinterpret any one firm’s disclosure 
as a reflection only upon that firm. Or perhaps investors are simply in denial.
 Ultimately, the arguments for overriding the market in social information seem to rest, not on 
a collective action problem, but on paternalism. The underlying normative idea is that investors 
ought to want social information more than the preferences they reveal in the market suggest that 
that they do.
Accordingly, the substitution of a regulatory regime for the current market in social 
information would entail the problems that one might expect of a paternalistic project. For 
example, given a diversity of views among investors as to the type and quantity of social 
information they want, and how much they are willing to pay for it, how would a regulator 
determine what information to require? There is, in my view, a real risk that an SEC social 
disclosure regulation would resemble a laundry-list of fashionable causes, which could contribute 
to a certain ethical conformism. Although this risk is also present in an unregulated solution where 
disclosure is driven by investor demand, the market has the advantage of easy adaptability, with the 
quantity and type of information provided evolving in response to changes in investors’ values, 
priorities and willingness to pay. The risk of conformism is, I might add, not present in the case of 
the shareholder proposal rule, since the latter relies entirely on investor initiative to bring questions 
of ethical or social responsibility to the attention of shareholders.134
A mandatory rule would also impose the costs of producing social disclosure on many 
shareholders who do not want the information. The compliance costs of a mandatory social 
disclosure regime, unlike those of the shareholder proposal mechanism, are likely to be 
considerable.135 Even the option of incorporation or reincorporation in a jurisdiction that prohibits 
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shareholder resolutions on social matters, available hypothetically if sufficient numbers of 
investors decided that the cost and nuisance of shareholder social proposals were too much to bear, 
would not be available in the case of a federal social disclosure regime designed to be mandatory.  
Without a widespread belief on the part of investors that the information is useful to them, I fear 
that the result is likely to be perfunctory compliance by management and resentment on the part of 
the majority of investors. 
As much as one might like for investors to be more interested than they are in information
about the social impact of corporate activities, it might be misguided to implement a costly new 
disclosure regime on the theory that their better selves would want the information.136
Conclusion
This Article has focused on the relationship among corporate law, shareholder responsibility 
and corporate social responsibility.
I have argued that corporate law is, at worst, ambiguous as to the legality of departures from 
profit maximization on account of corporate social responsibility. In practice, the law is permissive 
of corporate social responsibility. As a result, if corporations are in fact “pathological” profit-
maximizers, it is not because of corporate law, but because of pressure from shareholders.
To a corporate lawyer, the foundation of socially responsible investing — the source of 
investors’ ethical obligations and of their authority to translate these obligations into modifications 
of corporate conduct – is not the notion that shareholders are the “owners” of the corporation. 
Rather, their obligations rest on the fact that shareholders voluntarily occupy their position as the 
beneficiaries of corporate activity. Their authority rests both on their contractual rights, and on the 
fact that the shareholders have money at stake in any decision by corporate management to depart 
from profit maximization on account of ethical considerations.
Economic theorists of the corporation have constructed a model of the corporation from which 
some of them derive the conclusion that corporate law should contain at least a default rule 
requiring management to pursue, exclusively, the maximization of stockholder profits. But the so-
called contractarian model does not, by itself, entail profit maximization. I have argued that 
additional assumptions are necessary, in particular highly stylized assumptions about the impact of 
corporate activity on non-shareholders and about the ruthless self-interest of shareholders.
The ethical investor contradicts, by his or her motivation and actions, the assumption of self-
interest and creates awkwardness for defenders of the profit maximization norm. These defenders 
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respond by exceptionalizing ethical investors or by recasting their motivations as selfish. The first 
strategy fallaciously seeks to reconstruct the world to fit a preferred model. The second strategy is, 
I have argued, inappropriate because it requires one to believe, implausibly, that there is no 
difference between trying to do right and trying to improve one’s position. 
In applying these theoretical reflections to certain concrete questions of corporate law, I 
concluded that the continued availability of the proxy mechanism for shareholder social 
responsibility proposals could be supported on the basis that it is presumptively beneficial to all 
shareholders for them to be able to alert one another to possible sources of ethical concern in 
relation to their investment, and that the relatively modest costs of the mechanism are therefore 
appropriately borne by the corporation. I have argued, however, that the case for introducing 
mandatory social disclosure as a matter of corporate or securities law is weaker because there is a 
functioning market in social information for investors. If the prevailing levels and quality of social 
information appear to some scholars to be too low, it is not clear to me that there is any market 
failure justifying the substitution of a regulated outcome. 
The bottom line is that we need not be hopelessly idealistic to believe that shareholders have, 
and are capable of recognizing, ethical responsibilities in relation to their investment decisions. In 
practice, corporate law is accommodating of these responsibilities, as it should be. That prominent 
corporate law scholars cannot make sense of shareholder responsibilities is a reflection, not of the 
irrelevance of ethical and social responsibility to the shareholder’s decision, but of the limitations 
of the dominant theoretical framework.
